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Summary The Republic of Ireland has attracted a disproportionate share offapanese manufactur 
ing investment in Europe. The evolution of this investment is outlined and some characteristics of 
Japanese plants in Ireland are considered. Finally, some factors likely to hinder the future flow of 
Japanese investment to Ireland are assessed. 
Introduction' 
Japanese foreign investment on a significant scale is a relatively recent phenomenon: in 
1967, Japan accounted for a mere 1-3 per cent of the world total stock of foreign direct 
investment, as against 50 4 per cent for the United States and 15-6 per cent for the 
United Kingdom. A combination of Japanese government policy and the ability to 
penetrate foreign markets via exports of cheap home-produced goods had been primar 
ily responsible for this. Since the late 1960s, however, there has been a rapid growth of 
Japanese direct investment overseas, so that its share of the world total had risen to 7-2 
per cent by 1978, and has continued to rise since then. This development may be 
ascribed to a combination of factors, including a relaxation of Japanese government 
restrictions on overseas investment, the rapid rise in the value of the yen (which 
simultaneously made exports more expensive to sell and foreign assets less expensive to 
purchase), rising labour costs at home, and growing political resistance to Japanese 
imports in foreign markets. 
Over half of the recent growth in Japanese foreign manufacturing investment has 
occurred in the more traditional metals, chemicals and textiles sectors, and has been 
mainly located in Asia and Latin America, where access to resources, protected markets 
and supplies of cheap labour has clearly been an important consideration. Investment 
in more advanced sectors, such as machinery and electrical/electronic equipment, has 
been primarily focussed on the USA. Thus, in 1981, the USA accounted for almost one 
half of Japanese foreign investment in the electrical equipment sector, compared with 
less than 10 per cent for Europe. 
Overall, Europe has been in receipt of a very low level of Japanese direct investment 
in manufacturing less than 9 per cent of the total in 1985, compared with 31-5 per 
cent for North America. Europe's share of employment in Japanese overseas manufac 
turing plants is much lower than this again (in 1978 it was less than half of the region's 
share of Japanese manufacturing investment abroad) reflecting the relative labour 
intensity of Japanese investments in the less developed countries. Indeed, so small is 
the number ofJapanese plants in Europe that attempts to generalise from them must be 
extremely tentative: thus, Dicken (1983, 277-8) observes that four-fifths of Japanese 
investment in textiles in Europe is located in Ireland, and suggests that this may 
indicate an incipient tendency towards concentration. However, this four-fifths rep 
resents a single, albeit large scale, investment. Nevertheless, it may be observed that 
Japanese manufacturing investment in Europe covers a wide sectoral spread: in the case 
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of the EEC, the metals, machinery, electrical equipment, textiles, chemicals, and 
' other manufacturing 'sectors each accounted for over 10 per cent of the total in 1980. 
The evolution of Japanese manufacturing investment in Ireland 
Within the EEC, the Republic of Ireland has attracted a disproportionate share of 
Japanese manufacturing investment. In 1980, its share, at 18 per cent, was only slightly 
behind that of the UK (the EEC member state with the greatest share, at 19 per cent). 
This proportion, however, is rather distorted by the very large Asahi synthetic textiles 
plant (see below): at its peak level, in 1982, employment in Japanese plants in Ireland 
stood at 2,000, or one-third of the level suggested by Dicken (1983, 278) for the United 
Kingdom at that time. Nevertheless, this still accounted for 10 per cent of all employ 
ment in Japanese manufacturing plants in the EEC (prior to enlargement in 1986), as 
against Ireland's one per cent share of the Community's population. 
The advent of Japanese manufacturing plants followed quickly from Ireland's ac 
cession to the EEC in 1973. As Dicken (1983, 280) has argued, the primary stimulus for 
Japanese manufacturing investment in the EEC has been the preservation of markets. 
From 1973, Ireland was able to add access to the EEC market to a wide range of other 
incentives in order to provide a very attractive investment location for Japanese firms. 
These additional incentives included export profits tax relief, generous capital and 
training grants, a plentiful supply of well-educated and highly-motivated workers at 
relatively low cost, support services provided by the Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA), a political environment extremely supportive of private-including foreign 
enterprise, and-a consideration also highlighted by Dicken (1983, 282) in the particu 
lar context of Japanese investment an English language environment (Irish Times, 28 
April 1977; 16 June 1977; 6 March 1980). It has even been suggested that neutrality in 
the Second World War has worked to Ireland's advantage in terms of attracting 
Japanese investment in Europe (unnamed IDA spokesman, quoted in the Irish Times, 
9 December 1977). 
Japan became an important target of Irish efforts to attract foreign investment after 
1973, including the opening of an embassy in Tokyo and the mounting of a major 
promotional campaign by the IDA. These initiatives realised four investments in the 
following three years, involving a disparate range of products (Table 1): manganese 
dioxide, integrated circuits, acrylic fibre and porcelain. Given their pioneering nature, 
these emanated, for the most part, from large, internationally established, parent 
companies. 
By far the largest of these investments was the Asahi synthetic fibre plant, involving a 
capital investment of almost IRI50m-the largest single investment by a Japanese 
firm in Europe prior to the establishment of the Nissan car production plant at 
Washington New Town in England. Its establishment in Ireland coincided with the 
general slump of the synthetic textiles sector in Europe, and it has experienced severe 
difficulties from the beginning. It finally broke even for the first time in 1986, but only 
after major rationalisation and the writing off of accumulated losses of IRL39m in 1981. 
The commitment shown by Asahi to getting their plant into profit contrasts interest 
ingly with the closure of three other major foreign projects in the textiles sector in this 
period in Ireland. This exemplifies the long-term attitude which Japanese firms in 
general tend to adopt as regards the realisation of profits from major investments 
(Dicken 1988). In addition, for Asahi the maintenance of a European base was seen as 
being ' geopolitically very important ' (Irish Times, 16 December 1986). 
The establishment of a plant to manufacture integrated circuits by the Nippon 
Electric Company (NEC), one of Japan's leading electronics firms, was regarded as a 
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Table 1 Japanese manufacturing firms in the Republic of Ireland 
Fixed asset 
Year investment 
production (IRkm) Peak 
Firm Product commenced (current) employment 
Mitsui Denman Manganese dioxide 1974 11-2 160 
Nippon Electric Integrated circuits 1975 7 3 285 
Asahi Synthetic fibres 1977 48-6 480 
Noritake Porcelain 19771 2 3-5 300 
Arklow Pottery Pottery 19793 N.A. 500 
Nippon Denkai Copper foil 19792 1-5 30 
Toho Audio equipment 1980 4-8 100 
Donegal Dairy 
Products Cheese 19801 0 4 40 
Fujitsu Integrated circuits 1981 7 0 250 
Sord Personal computers 1982 7-1 100 
Logic Systems Microcomputers 1983 N.A. < 50 
Aval Electronic 
components 1983 N.A. < 50 
Sawafuji Audio equipment 19842 1-0 20 
Atari Amusement games 1986 4 055 90 
Notes: 1 Joint venture 
2 Since closed 
3 Year of takeover by Noritake 
4 Year of takeover by Namco 
5 Original investment (1974) 
N.A. Not available 
coup by the IDA, not only in terms of attracting Japanese investment, but also in 
relation to a campaign, being mounted at that time, to develop the electronics sector 
in Ireland. NEC subsequently located a semi-conductor plant in Scotland rather than 
in Ireland. According to the firm, this was because they were 'not enthusiastic about 
placing too much reliance on one country ' (Irish Times, 3 September 1980); however, it 
has been suggested (Kennedy 1983) that NEC decided not to locate the plant in Ireland 
after failing to obtain a major government contract which, it is alleged, was awarded to a 
French firm at a time when the Irish government was trying to get French government 
support for its policies in relation to Northern Ireland. 
The Noritake porcelain venture was unusual, not only in terms of the product 
involved, but also in that the main target market was North America, rather than the 
EEC, and that the project was a joint venture with an established indigenous company, 
Arklow Pottery. Noritake obtained a minority shareholding in Arklow Pottery as part 
of the deal, and this was subsequently expanded into a controlling interest. The original 
porcelain venture proved a failure, while Arklow Pottery itself has been experiencing 
severe difficulties, requiring major rationalisation and employment reduction (see 
below). 
After this initial spurt of Japanese investment in Ireland, there followed a period of 
inactivity, which coincided with a general slowdown in Japanese investment abroad in 
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the mid 1970s in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis (Dicken 1986). However, the 
upswing of the late seventies led to a renewal of Japanese interest in Ireland, mainly 
involving firms in the electronics sector (Table 1). Many of these projects were am 
bitious in their employment targets-ambitions which have fallen far short of realis 
ation due to the slowdown in the electronic components market in the 1980s. Thus, the 
Fujitsu integrated circuits plant was originally projected to employ 1,100 workers by 
1985, whereas actual employment had only reached 250 by the end of 1986. Similarly, 
the plant established by Sord (Japan's largest personal computer firm and manufac 
turers of the ' Orange ' rival to the Apple company range) was projected to employ 500 
by 1988, but has fallen well behind schedule. 
The other Japanese plants established in this period were mainly offshoots of small 
parent firms expanding overseas for the first time. As Dicken (1988) has observed, small 
firms have been occupying an unusually prominent position in the Japanese foreign 
investment picture, with Japan's giant trading companies playing an important sup 
porting role in this respect. In fact, the IDA has, since the late 1970s, been directing 
particular promotional emphasis to small Japanese firms employing 300 workers or 
less, which make up over 90 per cent of all Japanese manufacturing firms (Irish Times, 
27 April 1978). 
The current prolonged recession has led to a general reduction in foreign investment 
inflows to Ireland, and a virtual cessation of new Japanese projects (Table 1), apart 
from the small-scale and short-lived Sawafuji loudspeaker plant and the Namco take 
over of the already-established Atari amusement game operation, apparently as a result 
of a rationalisation of Atari's parent company, United Technologies of the USA, 
following a takeover by Warner Communications. Indeed, the first Japanese closures 
have been experienced, although none was significant in employment terms. However, 
there has been a significant decline in total employment in Japanese firms, from a high 
of 2,000 in 1982 to about 1,500 at the end of 1986, due mainly to cutbacks at Arklow 
Pottery and Asahi. No doubt because of the luxury nature of its product, Arklow 
Pottery has been particularly badly affected by recession; having obtained a controlling 
interest in 1979, Noritake implemented a rationalisation programme which has seen 
employment reduced from 500 in 1975 to 150 in mid-1987, along with the closure of the 
associated Noritake porcelain plant, although losses have continued to accumulate 
(Irish Times, 13 June 1987). At Asahi, rationalisation has seen employment fall from a 
peak of 480 in 1982 to 350 at the end of 1986, in which year the plant broke even for the 
first time in ten years of operation (Irish Times, 16 December 1986). 
Characteristics of Japanese manufacturing plants in Ireland 
While the proportion of Japanese investment in Europe which has located in Ireland is 
quite high, such investment represents a rather insignificant share of total foreign 
manufacturing investment in Ireland. At end-1985, Japanese firms accounted for a 
mere 1 35 per cent of all foreign firms, 2 per cent of employment in foreign firms, and 
4-3 per cent of capital investment by foreign firms (Irish Times, 18 November 1986). 
Despite the Asahi distortion, Japanese investment was less than 10 per cent of that 
originating in the USA, and was also less than the level of UK, German, Dutch and 
Canadian investment. 
Surveys of the operations of foreign manufacturing firms in Ireland have not dis 
tinguished the particular characteristics of Japanese firms, due to the rather insignifi 
cant proportion of the total which they represent. However, there seems little reason to 
expect them to differ from the general pattern of foreign investment in Ireland, which 
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includes a heavy emphasis on limited-skill assembly operations, little or no research 
and development, and few material linkages with the indigenous manufacturing sector; 
this is particularly the case with the electronics sector, in which the bulk of Japanese 
investments in Ireland have been concentrated (Telesis Consultancy Group 1982). 
One report states that Japanese firms conduct 'virtually no research and develop 
ment in Ireland', ascribing this to language and communications factors (Irish Times, 
16 December 1986). The most significant of the Japanese firms in the electronics 
industry in Ireland, NEC, carries out only assembly and testing at its Irish plant, 
obtains most of its materials from Japan, and distributes its products via the company's 
West German marketing subsidiary (information supplied by firm). 
Dicken (1983, 279) has noted that, in the past, Japanese firms have shown a strong 
preference worldwide for effecting foreign investments via joint ventures, a mechanism 
which at least in theory-should facilitate an amount of technology transfer and local 
spin-off. In the Irish case, the only two joint ventures have involved low-technology 
operations (cheese and porcelain). While the limited level of development of the in 
digenous Irish manufacturing sector may be put forward as a reason for the lack of joint 
ventures with Japanese (and, indeed, other foreign) firms, it is notable that the great 
majority of Japanese investments in the United Kingdom have also taken the form of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (Dicken 1983, 279). One suspects that the Japanese pref 
erence for joint ventures in the past may have been due to lack of experience in overseas 
investment and political/legal requirements (particularly where domestic markets are 
the primary targets of such investments, in contrast with the export orientation of 
Japanese investments in Ireland). 
One is wary of attempting any observations on the locational pattern of Japanese 
firms within Ireland (Map 1), given the small total of 14 involved. However, a strong 
orientation towards the Dublin region, particularly of electronics firms, is evident, 
which is in direct contrast to the general tendency among foreign investors over the last 
25 years (Breathnach 1982). Thus, the western rural regions-the major growth area of 
foreign investment-have been largely avoided, apart from the Asahi plant, whose 
location was determined to a considerable extent by water-supply and effluent require 
ments, and the Donegal Dairy Products joint venture, where access to raw materials has 
been the principal locational factor. However, it may be observed that the IDA has, in 
recent years, been encouraging the location of electronics firms in general in the Dublin 
area, in order to counteract the major shake-out of employment of older industrial 
sectors in that area in the 1970s, which has not been matched by new industrial growth 
(partly because of earlier positive discrimination in favour of other regions on the part 
of the IDA itself). Thus, in the period 1973-81, manufacturing employment in the East 
region (dominated by Dublin), which accounted for 47 per cent of the national total at 
the beginning of the period, declined by 15 per cent, while it grew by 19 per cent in the 
remainder of the state (calculated from data in Gillmor 1982, 41). 
Future prospects for Japanese investment in Ireland 
The IDA has, in the mid 1980s, launched a further major campaign to attract Japanese 
investment to Ireland, with the objective of securing a further 35 projects by 1990. 
There has, however, been a switch in emphasis, with software firms now constituting 
the principal target. Three major manufacturing projects have been recently 
announced. One of these Yamanouchi is thought to represent the first major 
foreign investment by the Japanese drugs industry. It is scheduled to begin production 
of an ulcer drug in a IRL20m plant in Dublin in 1988. The other projects-Seibulite 
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Map 1 Locations of Japanese manufacturing plants in the Republic of Ireland 
(reflective plastic sheetings) and Munekata (tools/plastic moulds)-will also be located 
in the Dublin region. 
However, a number of factors is likely to work against Ireland's prospects of attract 
ing further Japanese investment. For those Japanese firms (especially smaller ones) 
which continue to prefer the joint venture route for penetrating European markets 
and, despite the UK evidence quoted earlier, this route appears to be still quite popular 
(Kennedy 1983)-Ireland, for reasons already mentioned, will offer few attractions. A 
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factor with potentially much more serious implications for Ireland is the EEC's grow 
ing trade deficit with Japan (Kennedy 1983). As a proportion of Japanese exports to the 
EEC, EEC exports to Japan declined from 73 per cent in 1970 to an alarming 35 per 
cent in 1982 (Baumann 1984, 3), with only a slight improvement to 37 per cent in 1985 
(Commission of the European Communities 1987, 6). Political pressures to correct this 
imbalance have included calls for an accelerated rate of Japanese investment in the 
Community. However, going on Dicken's (1983, 282) argument that' political factors 
will be more decisive in influencing the location of Japanese manufacturing investment 
in Europe than the purely economic ', such investment is likely to be focussed on those 
member states with the largest trade deficits with Japan. Ireland, apart from being a 
relatively minor trading partner of Japan, compared with the major EEC member 
states, also happens to have a healthier trade balance: Ireland's exports to Japan in 1986 
represented 51 per cent of exports in the opposite direction (Irish Times, 28 April 1987). 
Finally, the entry of Spain to the EEC in 1986 could also negatively affect the flow of 
Japanese investment to Ireland. Spain was already, prior to EEC membership, the 
leading host country ofJapanese investment in Western Europe, with 18 wholly-owned 
production units representing a total investment of some $200m (Irish Times, 20 March 
1985). In addition, there were 50 joint ventures between Japanese and Spanish firms. 
While much of this investment will have been generated by a desire to gain access to the 
substantial but (prior to EEC entry) heavily-protected Spanish market, the prospects 
of further penetrating the much larger EEC market from a Spanish base will undoubt 
edly greatly enhance the attractiveness of Spain as an investment location for Japanese 
firms. To this should be added a series of other Spanish attractions, including avail 
ability of skilled workers, low wage levels (by EEC standards), declining inflation, and 
tax benefits (Irish Times, 20 March 1985). The considerable experience already gained 
by Japanese firms from operating in Spain seems likely to play an important role in 
generating further Japanese investment there, particularly as informal ' word-of 
mouth ' communications between firms are thought to play an important part in 
influencing Japanese overseas investment decisions (Irish Times, 28 April 1977). Spain, 
therefore, is likely to prove a major future rival to Ireland as a low-cost export base for 
penetrating the EEC market. 
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